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our ship of state through the storms of the first three national administrations — among them Franklin, Washington, John Adams, Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison and Jay — form “a galaxy of public men” not less distinguished than that which adorns the Jacksonian epoch.

One result of such exaggeration is to obscure the organic relation of the period treated to other periods. Another is a faulty distribution of emphasis in dealing with its different issues: those which engage public attention most fully at the time, and, in particular, such as after severe struggles are then definitely settled, receive more than their just share of consideration; while those that had to wait for settlement until a late period, even when their relation to the public welfare is more vital, suffer comparative neglect; and what is true of the issues is equally true of the leaders associated with them. Each of these results appears in the book before us: the period itself is presented with too little regard for its organic relation to subsequent periods; while scant space and scant appreciation are dealt out to the issues raised by the nullification and anti-slavery movements and to their leaders, Calhoun and Garrison. It may be added that in measuring political values the writer, as a rule, does not rate as highly as they seem to deserve those services and those public servants that did most to strengthen the Union against the time of stress that was soon to come. In no other way can I account for the relegation of Webster to the obscure background of a picture in which, according to the traditional view, he deserves one of the foremost positions. These defects are, so to speak, structural and therefore serious. Nevertheless, the great excellencies of the book entitle the author to the gratitude of every student of the Jacksonian epoch.

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ANSON D. MORSE.

History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850. By JAMES FORD RHODES. Vol. IV, 1862-1864. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1899. — xvi, 557 pp.

The latest volume of Mr. Rhodes's history has for its scope the vital part of the Civil War. It begins with McClellan's march to the neighborhood of Richmond and closes with Grant's arrival at the same relative position. This period is full of intricate problems for the historical student. The historical facts pertaining to it lie concealed in a hundred volumes of records, memoirs and biographies, and over all is the uncertainty of controversy. That Mr. Rhodes

has gone through all with such careful industry and correct spirit is essentially commendable. It is, perhaps, not too much to say that his book is the best general treatment of the subject.

The style is, in a sense, dramatic. The author has a rare faculty of keeping behind the point of greatest interest. Thus, in the Gettysburg campaign he begins with Lee's invasion of the North, following the Southern army till it is well over the border. When that point is reached, the story shifts to the magnificent concentration of Meade at Gettysburg. Next, the narrator is with the Confederates, and the reader sees the battle from their standpoint; for is this not the battle of all battles for the South? In regard to the charge on Cemetery Ridge there is all the admiration for the charging hosts that the most ardent Confederate could desire. In this way one moves on from event to event with ease, not to say with animation.

Another point in favor of Mr. Rhodes is the use he makes of documents. He is thus able to make an event appear to the reader of to-day in all the lights and shades that it had when it was a vital issue to the people of the past. An illustration is his treatment of the campaign of Grant in Virginia in 1864. It has been the custom to speak of this as a hopeless struggle to the South, and so it was. But that is not the way it appeared to the people of the North at that time. Says the author:

Despondency and discouragement are the words which betray the state of feeling at the North during the month of July, and the closer one's knowledge of affairs the gloomier was his view; but the salient facts put into every one's mind the pertinent question, "Who shall revive the withered hopes that bloomed on the opening of Grant's campaign?"

There were the terrible losses in battle, the desertions from the army, the dark political prospects, the shudder of terror on account of the near approach of Early to Washington, the frightful expenses of the government, the financial distress and ever the call for more troops. When we read the cold narrative of these things, we are better able to see how it was that the South still believed that they would yet be successful. They believed, as Jefferson Davis said to Jaquess and Gilmore, that Lee had outgeneraled Grant, that the latter was no nearer to Richmond than at the beginning of his campaign and that Sherman was destined to be cut off from his base of supplies.

As to money [continued Davis] we are richer than you. You smile; but admit that our paper is worth nothing — it answers as a circulating medium, and we hold it all ourselves. If every dollar of it were lost, we should, as

we have no foreign debt, be none the poorer. But it *is* worth something ; it has the solid basis of a large cotton crop, while yours rests on nothing, and you owe all the world. As to resources, we do not lack for arms or ammunition, and we have still a large territory from which to gather supplies.

Another point that is apt to arrest the attention of the reader is the position of McClellan as a military leader. It will be a long time before the American public will cease to dispute over this question. Mr. Rhodes has succeeded in showing McClellan's strong points and his weak ones. His organizing ability, his knowledge of tactics, his popularity with his troops and his long endurance are all qualities of the best generalship. But his timidity and his lack of aggressiveness will always take from him the rank of a great leader. And this is not to be excused by the interference of the President in military affairs. Nobody knew better than Lincoln the faults of McClellan. He had known him before the war began, and had had some rather unpromising political and business experiences with him. The President's interference usually followed some conviction that a general was not doing all that the military situation warranted. It was practised on Halleck, on Hooker, on Burnside and on others ; but when Grant took command there was at once evident about him something that had the air of successful method — something which convinced Lincoln that interference was not necessary. And for the whole Wilderness campaign, in spite of terrifying losses, Grant was given a free hand. It was only when the army lay broken before Petersburg that Lincoln began to show the least sign of uneasiness, and that was soon relieved by Sheridan's brilliant exploits in the Valley.

Comparing Grant and McClellan, Mr. Rhodes says :

In the judgment of many military critics, Grant had not been equal to his opportunities, had not made the best use of his advantages, and had secured no gain commensurate with his loss. Yet the friends of McClellan, who maintain that, because McClellan reached the same ground near Richmond with comparatively little sacrifice of life, his campaign had the greater merit, miss the main point of the situation — that the successive hammering of Lee's army was a necessary concomitant of success. They attach to the capture of the Confederate capital the subjugation of the South, ignoring that Grant was supremely right in making Lee's army his first objective and Richmond only his second. His strategy was superior to McClellan's, in that he grasped the aim of the war, and resolutely and grimly stuck to his purpose, in spite of defeats and losses which would have dismayed any

but the stoutest soul; and criticism of him is not sound unless it proves, as perhaps it does, that there might have been the same persistent fighting of the Army of Northern Virginia without so great a slaughter of Northern soldiers.

While the main interest of the book is Northern, the treatment of the South is extensive enough and considerate enough to satisfy any Southerner of reasonable disposition. A Southerner writing with the same spirit of accuracy would, indeed, make the best history of the war from the Confederate standpoint. He would say more about the internal condition of the Confederacy, and his accounts of battles would be written from the standpoint of those who wore the gray. Such a work is the most crying need now existing in the field of the history of the war; and if it were written, it would probably sell widely enough to repay the cost of publishing.

There is in this book a wholesome absence of eulogy. Lee is painted as he was — a strong and resourceful general, but without that glamour of chivalry which Southerners are accustomed to throw about him. He is, says the author, not to be classed as a Napoleon. This will not be a popular statement to repeat at Confederate reunions, but it is the truth. It is, moreover, in keeping with the treatment of the Northern heroes; for there is enough mention of the shortcomings of Lincoln to save him from idealization; and Grant, in both his public and his private capacity, is held up for inspection in the same spirit. It is fortunate that there is in the country an historical student like Mr. Rhodes. His succeeding volumes, especially his treatment of Reconstruction times, will be awaited with interest. It is right for him to feel that the most interesting part of his work is before him.

JOHN S. BASSETT.

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Thaddeus Stevens. By SAMUEL W. MCCALL. (American Statesmen Series.) Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co, 1899. — 369 pp.

In the congressional history of the Civil War and Reconstruction, Thaddeus Stevens will always be the most dramatic figure. Although long past the prime of life, he was able to control Congress and to dictate much of its most important legislation. Even when he was unable at first to accomplish what he desired, he not infrequently had the satisfaction of seeing Congress gradually come to his standpoint, thus securing ultimate triumph. The biographer of Thaddeus Stevens is called upon to determine whether such facts prove that he